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Upper and lower conditional probabilities are deﬁned by Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures,
when the conditioning events have positive and ﬁnite Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures in their
dimension, otherwise, when the conditioning events have Hausdorﬀ outer or inner measure equal
to zero or inﬁnity in their dimension, they are deﬁned by a 0–1 valued ﬁnitely, but not countably,
additive probability. Examples are given when the r-ﬁeld of the conditioning events is the r-ﬁeld
of countable and co-countable subsets of [0,1], the tail r-ﬁeld and the r-ﬁeld of symmetric events.
The deﬁnitions of s-independence and s-irrelevance with respect to these upper and lower condi-
tional probabilities are introduced to assure that logical independence is a necessary condition of sto-
chastic independence. It is also proved that s-irrelevance is a suﬃcient condition for strong
independence introduced for credal sets. An example is given to show that the converse is not true.
The deﬁnitions of s-independence and strong independence are equivalent when all subsets of the
sample space X have the same Hausdorﬀ dimension, as it happens when X is a ﬁnite set.
The deﬁnition of s-conditional irrelevance is given and a generalized factorization property is pro-
posed as a necessary condition of s-conditional irrelevance. Examples are given to show that s-con-
ditional irrelevance and s-irrelevance are not related; moreover, suﬃcient conditions are given for
equivalence between s-conditional irrelevance and s-irrelevance.
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One of the most general probabilistic approaches to deal with uncertainty in complex
phenomena can be found in the theory of imprecise probabilities [12], in which uncertainty
can be represented by sets of probability distributions. Coherence of each such set is
obtained by restricting the attention to closed convex sets of measures. The extreme points
of these sets are called vertices or extremes. Given an additive probability P deﬁned on a
r-ﬁeld and an event belonging to this r-ﬁeld, the largest set associated to the given event
has extreme points determined by the natural extensions of P, which are the inner and
outer measures generated by P.
Given a non-empty set X, an arbitrary family F of subsets of X and a partition B of X, a
conditional event, also denoted by EjB, is deﬁned by the ordered pair (E,B) belonging to
the Cartesian product F B; to every conditional event we can associate an interval of
conditional probabilities, whose extreme points are called upper and lower conditional
probabilities respectively denoted by P ðEjBÞ and P ðEjBÞ. For every B in the partition B,
given an additive probability P ðjBÞ deﬁned on a r-ﬁeld and an event E, belonging to this
r-ﬁeld, the largest set associated to the conditional event EjB has extreme points deter-
mined by the natural extensions of P ðjBÞ, which are the inner and outer measures gener-
ated by P ðjBÞ.
In the approach of Walley upper and lower conditional probabilities are required to be
separately coherent, that is P ðjBÞ and PðjBÞ are respectively coherent upper and lower
probabilities and P ðBjBÞ ¼ P ðBjBÞ ¼ 1 for every B in the partition B.
In the axiomatic approach conditional probability [1] is deﬁned with respect to a r-ﬁeld
of conditioning events instead of a partition of events. But the two approaches can be
compared (see Section 3).
The problem is that natural extensions of a regular conditional probability deﬁned in
the continuous framework by the Radon–Nikodym derivative, cannot be always sepa-
rately coherent.
Non-separate coherence of conditional probability, deﬁned in the axiomatic way, is due
to some problems related to the axiomatic deﬁnition of regular conditional probability (or
regular conditional distribution) Q(A,x) on a r-ﬁeld F given a sub r-ﬁeld G. A regular
conditional probability cannot be exist [6]; moreover, even if it exists, if F is a r-ﬁeld
countably generated and G is a sub r-ﬁeld of F not countably generated, then there exists
no regular, proper conditional probability Q(A,x) on F given G, that is QðH ;xÞ ¼ 1 for
x 2 H 2 G [2,3].
In the paper of Seidenfeld et al. [11] improper regular conditional distributions are stud-
ied. The authors established that when regular conditional probability exists and the sub
r-ﬁeld G is countably generated it is almost surely proper, but when the sub r-ﬁeld G is
not countably generated the regular conditional probability can be maximally improper,
that is QðH ;xÞ ¼ 0 for x 2 H 2 G, almost surely.
As a consequence of the results proved in the quoted paper we have that conditional
probability, deﬁned by the Radon–Nikodym derivative is not separately coherent every
time that the r-ﬁeld of the conditioning events is not countably generated. So there is
the necessity to introduce a new tool to assess conditional probabilities, which are sepa-
rately coherent.
An alternative probabilistic approach that always assures the existence of a proper con-
ditional probability is the one proposed by de Finetti [4,5] and Dubins [7]. So upper and
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kinds of conditional probabilities.
In Section 2 of this paper we recall some preliminaries about Hausdorﬀ outer and inner
measures, which are the tools used to deﬁne upper and lower conditional probabilities
when the conditioning events have positive and ﬁnite Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures
in their dimension.
In Section 3 of this paper upper and lower conditional probabilities are given by natural
extensions of a ﬁnitely additive conditional probability in the sense of Dubins, which is
assigned by a class of Hausdorﬀ measures, when the conditioning events have positive
and ﬁnite Hausdorﬀ measure in their dimension; otherwise, when the conditioning events
have Hausdorﬀ measure equal to zero or inﬁnity in their dimension, it is deﬁned by a 0–1
valued ﬁnitely, but not countably, additive probability.
Upper and lower conditional probabilities assigned by Hausdorﬀ outer and inner mea-
sures can be used in all cases where the axiomatic deﬁnition produces conditional proba-
bilities that are not separately coherent, that is when the r-ﬁeld of the conditioning events
is not countably generated. In particular we consider examples of upper and lower condi-
tional probabilities assigned by Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures when the r-ﬁeld of the
conditioning events G is equal to the r-ﬁeld of countable or co-countable sets, to the tail r-
ﬁeld and equal to the r-ﬁeld of symmetric events.
A concept related to the deﬁnition of probability and conditional probability is prob-
abilistic independence. In a continuous probabilistic space (X,F,P), where X is equal to
½0; 1n and the probability is usually assumed equal to the Lebesgue measure on X, we have
that the ﬁnite, countable and fractal sets (i.e. the sets with Hausdorﬀ dimension non-inte-
ger) have probability equal to zero. For these sets the standard deﬁnition of independence,
given by the factorization property, is always satisﬁed since both members of the equality
are zero. Moreover, the notions of epistemic irrelevance and epistemic independence, pro-
posed by Walley, are not related to the notion of logical independence when the events
have zero lower probability (see Example 4 of Section 4).
In Section 4, the notions of s-irrelevance and s-independence with respect to upper and
lower conditional probabilities assigned by a class of Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures
are proposed to test independence of sets with Hausdorﬀ dimension less than the dimen-
sion of X and to assure that logical independence is a necessary condition of probabilistic
independence.
The deﬁnitions of s-independence and s-irrelevance are based on the fact that
epistemic independence and irrelevance, introduced by Walley, must be tested for events
A and B, such that they and their intersection AB, have the same Hausdorﬀ dimen-
sion. With this further condition we prove that s-independence implies logical
independence.
According to this approach to independence, sets that represent events can be imagined
divided in diﬀerent layers; in each layer there are sets with the same Hausdorﬀ dimension;
two events A and B are s-independent if and only if the events A and B and their intersec-
tion AB belong to the same layer and they are epistemically independent. Moreover, exam-
ples of s-independent events are given in Section 5.
In Section 6 of this paper the link between s-independence and strong independence pro-
posed by Levi [10], for credal sets of probabilities, is investigated. This property essentially
requires that each extreme point of the largest credal set K(AB) satisﬁes the factorization
property with the marginal K(A) and K(B).
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show that the converse is not true.
In Section 7, the deﬁnitions of s-conditional irrelevance and s-conditional independence
are proposed and the factorization property is generalized to the case where the condition-
ing event is diﬀerent from X. It is proved that the generalized factorization property is a
necessary condition of s-conditional irrelevance. An example is given to show that the con-
verse is not true.
s-Conditional irrelevance and s-irrelevance are compared. Generally, the two concepts
are not related; events A, B and C are proposed, such that B is s-conditional irrelevant to A
given C, but B is not s-irrelevant to A. Moreover, events A and B are considered such that
B is s-irrelevant to A but B is not s-conditional irrelevant to A given X.
It is proven that the two notions are equivalent when C is equal to X and the events A,
B, AB and the complement of B have Hausdorﬀ dimension equal to X.2. Preliminaries about Hausdorﬀ measures
In this section, we recall some preliminaries about Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures,
that we use to deﬁne upper and lower conditional probabilities when the conditioning
events B have ﬁnite and positive Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures in their dimension.
For more details about Hausdorﬀ measures see for example Falconer [8].
Let (X,d) be the Euclidean metric space with X ¼ ½0; 1n. The diameter of a non-empty
set U of X is deﬁned as jU j ¼ supfjx yj : x; y 2 Ug and if a subset A of X is such that
A  SiU i and 0 < jUij < d for each i, the class fUig is called a d-cover of A. Let s be a
non-negative number. For d > 0 we deﬁne hsdðAÞ ¼ inf
P1
i¼1jUijs, where the inﬁmum is
over all d-covers fUig. The Hausdorﬀ s-dimensional outer measure of A, denoted by
hsðAÞ, is deﬁned as hsðAÞ ¼ limd!0hsdðAÞ. This limit exists, but may be inﬁnite, since
hsdðAÞ increases as d decreases.
The Hausdorﬀ dimension of a set A, dimHðAÞ, is deﬁned as the unique value, such that
hsðAÞ ¼ 1 if 0 6 s < dimHðAÞ
0 if dimHðAÞ < s < 1

We can observe that if 0 < hsðAÞ < 1 then dimHðAÞ ¼ s, but the converse is not true. We
assume that the Hausdorﬀ dimension of the empty set is equal to 1 so no event has Haus-
dorﬀ dimension equal to the empty set.
If an event A is such that dimHðAÞ ¼ s < n, then the Hausdorﬀ dimension of the com-
plementary set Ac is equal to n since the following relation holds:
dimHðA [ BÞ ¼ maxfdimHðAÞ; dimHðBÞg:
A subset A of X is called measurable with respect to the outer measure hs if it decomposes
every subset of X additively, that is if hsðEÞ ¼ hsðA \ EÞ þ hsðE  AÞ for all sets E  X.
The restriction of hs to the r-ﬁeld of hs-measurable sets, containing the r-ﬁeld of the
Borelian sets, is called Hausdorﬀ s-dimensional measure. In particular the Hausdorﬀ
zero-dimensional measure is the counting measure and the Hausdorﬀ one-dimensional
measure is the Lebesgue measure.
The most familiar set of real numbers of non-integer Hausdorﬀ dimension is the Cantor
set.
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etc., where Ejþ1 is obtained by removing the open middle third of each interval in Ej.
The Cantor’s set is the perfect set E ¼ T1j¼0Ej. The Hausdorﬀ dimension of the Cantor
set is s ¼ log 2= log 3 and hsðEÞ ¼ 1. The Cantor set and its complementary set are consid-
ered in Example 10 of Section 7.
It is important to recall the relation between the Hausdorﬀ measure of order n, denoted
by hn and the Lebesgue measure of order n, ln. If E is a subset of X ¼ ½0; 1n, then
lnðEÞ ¼ cnhnðEÞ, where
cn ¼ p
1
2n
2n 1
2
n
 
!
:
In particular c1 ¼ 1 and c2 ¼ p4.
3. Upper and lower conditional probabilities assigned by Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures
In the approach of Walley [12] coherent conditional probabilities are considered as spe-
cial cases of coherent conditional previsions, that are characterized in the case where con-
ditioning events form a partition B of X.
Given a non-empty set X, a gamble X is a bounded function from X to R (the set of real
numbers) and let L be the set of all gambles on X. When K is a linear space of gambles a
coherent lower prevision P is a real function deﬁned on K, such that the following condi-
tions hold for every X and Y in K:
(1) P ðX ÞP infðX Þ
(2) P ðkX Þ ¼ kP ðX Þ for every positive constant k
(3) P ðX þ Y ÞP P ðX Þ þ PðY Þ
Let B denote a partition ofX, that is a non-empty, pair wise-disjoint subsets whose union
is X. For B in B letH(B) be the set of gambles deﬁned on B which includes the gamble B (we
denote with the same symbol the set that represents an event and the indicator function of
the event). A lower conditional prevision P ðX jBÞ is a real function deﬁned onH(B). Coherent
conditional previsions P ðX jBÞ, deﬁned for B in B and X in H(B), are required to be sepa-
rately coherent, that is for every conditioning event B PðjBÞ is a coherent lower prevision
on the domain H(B) and P ðBjBÞ ¼ 1. Let P ðjBÞ be the conjugate upper conditional previ-
sion, deﬁned on the domain – K, which contains all gambles X, such that – X belongs to K.
If P ðjBÞ are linear previsions, that is P ðjBÞ ¼ P ðjBÞ for every B in B, then a linear condi-
tional prevision P ðX jBÞ is deﬁned by P ðX jBÞ ¼ P ðX jBÞ ¼ P ðX jBÞ for every B in B.
When the domain HðBÞ ¼ F is a class of events, that can be regarded as a class of 0–1
valued gambles, P ðAjBÞ is a lower conditional probability. Denoted by Fc ¼ fAc : A 2 Fg
the upper conditional probability is deﬁned by P ðAjBÞ ¼ 1 P ðAcjBÞ
In particular when P ðjBÞ is a countably additive probability deﬁned on a r-ﬁeld F, its
natural extensions to the class of all subsets of X, are the outer and inner measures gener-
ated by it (see Theorem 3.1.5 of [12]). They determine the largest interval of conditional
probabilities associated to a conditional event.
In the axiomatic approach [1] conditional expectation and conditional probability are
deﬁned with respect to a r-ﬁeld G of conditioning events, rather than a partition B; the
two deﬁnitions can be compared.
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ﬁeld generated by a countable class C of subsets of F and let B be the partition generated
by the class the C. Denote by X0 ¼ B and wB the function from X to X0 that associates to
every x 2 X the atom B of the partition B that contains x; then we have that
PðjGÞ ¼ P ðjBÞ  wB (see [9, p. 262]).
In the continuous framework, upper and lower conditional probabilities separately
coherent cannot be always obtained as natural extensions of a conditional probability
deﬁned in the axiomatic way. It is due to some problems related to the axiomatic deﬁnition
of regular conditional probability.
To avoid this problem in this section upper and lower conditional probabilities are
given by the inner and outer measures generated by the Hausdorﬀ dimensional measures.
They are natural extensions to the class of all subsets of X ¼ ½0; 1n of a ﬁnitely additive
conditional probability, in the sense of Dubins [7] assigned by a class of Hausdorﬀ mea-
sures. From the axioms deﬁning ﬁnitely additive probabilities in the sense of Dubins it fol-
lows that they are always separately coherent.
Let F and G be two ﬁelds of subsets of X, with G  F, P* is a ﬁnitely additive conditional
probability, [7], on ðF;GÞ if it is a real function deﬁned on FG0, where G0 ¼ G f;g
such that the following conditions hold:
(I) given any H 2 G0 and A1; . . . ;An 2 F such that their union belongs to F and AiAj ¼ ;
for i5j, the function P 	ðjHÞ deﬁned on F is such that
P 	ðAjHÞP 0; P 	
[n
k¼1
AkjH
 !
¼
Xn
k¼1
P 	 ðAkjHÞ; P 	ðXjHÞ ¼ 1
(II) P 	ðH jHÞ ¼ 1 if H 2 F \G0,
(III) given E 2 F, H 2 F, EH 2 F with A 2 G0 and EA 2 G0 then P 	ðEH jAÞ ¼
P 	ðEjAÞP 	ðH jEAÞ.
From conditions (I) and (II) we have
(II 0) P 	ðAjHÞ ¼ 1 if A 2 F, H 2 G0 and HA.
These conditional probabilities are coherent in the sense of de Finetti, since conditions
(I)–(III) are suﬃcient for the coherence of P* on C ¼ FG0 when F and G are ﬁelds of
subsets of X with G  F or G is an additive subclass of F; otherwise, if F and G are
two arbitrary families of subsets of X, such that X 2 F, the previous conditions are neces-
sary for the coherence, but not suﬃcient.
In the following theorem upper conditional probabilities are given by Hausdorﬀ outer
measures, when conditioning events have positive and ﬁnite Hausdorﬀ outer measure in
their dimension; otherwise, when they have inﬁnite or zero Hausdorﬀ outer measure in
their dimension, upper conditional probability is deﬁned by a 0–1 valued probability mea-
sure m, that is ﬁnitely additive but not countably additive. This choice of m assures that
condition (III) of a ﬁnitely conditional probability in the sense of Dubins, is veriﬁed.
Theorem 1. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n let F be the r-field of all subsets of ½0; 1n and let G be an additive
subclass of F. Let us denote by hs the Hausdorff s-dimensional outer measure, by s the
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probability measure such that if 0 < htðAHÞ < 1 and hsðHÞ ¼ 1 then mðAHÞ ¼ 0. Then the
function P defined on C ¼ FG0 such that
P ðAjHÞ ¼
hsðAHÞ
hsðHÞ if 0 < h
sðHÞ < 1
mðAHÞ if hsðHÞ ¼ 0;1
(
is an upper conditional probability.Proof. Firstly we prove that the restriction of P to the Cartesian product of FG0, where
F is the Borel r-ﬁeld of ½0; 1n is a coherent conditional probability. The restriction of the
Hausdorff s-dimensional outer measure to the r-ﬁeld of the Borelian sets of ½0; 1n is a
measure for every s so, by deﬁnition, we have, that P ðjHÞ veriﬁes conditions (I) and (II).
To prove condition (III), that is P ðEH jAÞ ¼ PðEjAÞPðH jEAÞ, for E 2 F, H 2 F, EH 2 F
with A 2 G0 and EA 2 G0, we distinguish the following cases:
(a) conditioning events A and EA have positive and ﬁnite Hausdorff measures, then
condition (III) can be written as
hsðEAHÞ
hsðAÞ ¼
hsðEAÞ
hsðAÞ 
htðEAHÞ
htðEAÞ ð1Þ
Two cases are possible: (i) s ¼ t or (ii) s > t. If (i) holds, then (1) is obviously satisﬁed. If
(ii) holds then hsðEAÞ ¼ 0 and also, by the monotony of hs, hsðEAHÞ ¼ 0; so Eq. (1) is
satisﬁed;
(b) conditioning events A and EA have both inﬁnite or zero Hausdorff measures, then
condition (III) becomes mðEAHÞ ¼ mðEAHÞmðEAÞ and it is always satisﬁed because m
is monotone;
(c) conditioning event A has inﬁnite Hausdorff measure and conditioning event EA has
positive and ﬁnite Hausdorff measure then from the deﬁnition of m it follows that con-
dition (III) becomes 0 ¼ 0 hsðEAHÞhsðEAÞ , and it is obviously satisﬁed.
Then from Theorem 3.1.5 of [12] we have that if 0 < hsðHÞ < 1, then P is the natural
extension to C ¼ FG0; moreover, if hsðHÞ ¼ 0 or 1 then m can be extended to
C ¼ FG0 since m is ﬁnitely additive, but not countably additive. The existence of the
measure m is a consequence of the prime ideal theorem. h
The lower conditional probability P ðAjHÞ can be deﬁned as in the previous theorem if hs
denotes the Hausdorﬀ s-dimensional inner measure.
We can obtain the unconditional upper and lower probabilities from the conditional
ones by the equalities P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAjXÞ ¼ and P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAjXÞ.
In particular if X ¼ ½0; 1n we have that P ðAjXÞ ¼ hnðAÞhnðXÞ ¼ lnðAÞ, where ln is the Lebesgue
outer measure of order n.
The upper conditional probability deﬁned in the previous Theorem 1 can be used to
assess conditional upper probabilities separately coherent when the class of conditioning
events is not a countably generated r-ﬁeld and extensions of conditional probability,
deﬁned in the axiomatic way, are not separately coherent.
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and co-countable subsets of X. From Theorem 1 we have that an upper conditional
probability on C ¼ FG0 can be deﬁned by
PðAjHÞ ¼
h1ðAHÞ
h1ðHÞ H co-countable
h0ðAHÞ
h0ðHÞ H finite
mðAHÞ H countable
8><
>>:
where m is a 0–1 valued ﬁnitely additive, but not countably, additive probability measure.
An other example of not countably generated r-ﬁeld is the tail r-ﬁeld.
Given a sequence A1;A2; . . . of events in a probability space (X,F,P) consider the
r-ﬁeld, rðAn;Anþ1; . . .Þ generated by the events An;Anþ1; . . . The tail r-ﬁeld associated
with the sequences fAng is deﬁned by \1n¼1rðAn;Anþ1; . . .Þ and its elements are called tail
events.
Example 2. Let us consider the process corresponding to ﬂips of a fair coin. Let X be the
sample space of inﬁnite binary sequences, that is X is a countable set, whose points are
countable sets. Let F be the class of all subsets of X and let G be the tail r-ﬁeld of this
process. The atoms of G, that are the intersections of all the elements of G that contain a
given point x of X, are countable sets of points and they belong to G. So in G there are
countable sets, that have inﬁnite Hausdorff measure in their dimension.
From Theorem 1 we have that a (upper) conditional probability on C ¼ FG0 can be
deﬁned by
P ðAjHÞ ¼ mðAHÞ
where m is a 0–1 valued ﬁnitely additive, but not countably, additive probability measure.
In the following example we consider the r-ﬁeld of the conditioning events equal to the
r-ﬁeld of the symmetric events, that is the r-ﬁeld generated by the class T of all ﬁnite per-
mutations of the coordinates of X, where X is the simple space of inﬁnite binary sequences.
A ﬁnite permutation T is a permutation that leaves all but ﬁnitely many coordinates of a
point x of X unchanged. An event B such that B ¼ T1ðBÞ, for all ﬁnite permutations T, is
called a symmetric event.
Example 3. Let X be the sample space of inﬁnite binary sequences, that is X is a countable
set, whose points are countable sets. Let F be the class of all subsets of X and let G be the
r-ﬁeld of symmetric events. The atoms of G are countable sets of points and they belong to
G. That is, all but two atoms of G are countably inﬁnite sets of points related by the
equivalence relation that elements differ by a ﬁnite permutation of their sequences. The
two distinguished atoms of G are the two constant sequences ð0; 0; . . .Þ and ð1; 1; . . .Þ. So in
G there are countable sets, that have inﬁnite Hausdorff measure in their dimension.
From Theorem 1 we have that a (upper) conditional probability on C ¼ FG0 can be
deﬁned by
P ðAjHÞ ¼ mðAHÞ
where m is a 0–1 valued ﬁnitely, but not countably, additive probability measure.
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In this section, the new deﬁnitions of s-irrelevance and s-independence are introduced in
order to assure that logical independence is a necessary condition of probabilistic indepen-
dence. In particular s-independence between two events is proven to imply their logical
independence when both events have Hausdorﬀ dimension less than n, which is the Haus-
dorﬀ dimension of X. Moreover, also when the events have Hausdorﬀ dimension equal to
n and upper probability greater than zero and less than one, then logical independence is a
necessary condition for s-independence.
Firstly we analyse the concept of epistemic independence for events proposed by Walley
[12] with respect to upper and lower conditional probabilities deﬁned by Hausdorﬀ dimen-
sional outer and inner measures. The concept of epistemic independence is based on the
notion of irrelevence; given two events A and B, we say that B is irrelevant to A when
P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ P ðAÞ and P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ P ðAÞ.
A and B are epistemically independent when B is irrelevant to A and A is irrelevant to B.
As a consequence of this deﬁnition we can obtain the factorization property
P ðABÞ ¼ P ðAÞP ðBÞ that constitutes the standard deﬁnition of independence for events.
Let X ¼ ½0; 1n and let P and P be the upper and lower conditional probabilities deﬁned
by the outer and inner Hausdorﬀ measures. When the events A and B or their comple-
ments have not upper probability equal to zero, epistemic independence implies logical
independence, (i.e. each of four sets AB, ABc, AcB, AcBc is non-empty). Otherwise we
can have that logically dependent events can be epistemically independent as it is shown
in the following example.
Example 4. Let X ¼ ½0; 1, let F be the r-ﬁeld of all subsets of ½0; 1 and letG be the additive
subclass of F of sets that are ﬁnite and co-ﬁnite. Let A and B be two ﬁnite subsets of ½0; 1
such that AB ¼ ;. If conditional probability is deﬁned as in Theorem 1 we have that
P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBÞ ¼ h
0ðABÞ
h0ðBÞ ¼ 0; P ðAjB
cÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ h
1ðABcÞ
h1ðBcÞ ¼ 0 and P ðAÞ
¼ P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAjXÞ ¼ h
1ðAÞ
h1ðXÞ ¼ 0
So A and B are logically dependent but epistemically independent.
The previous example evidences the necessity to introduce the following deﬁnition.Deﬁnition 1. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n, let F be the r-ﬁeld of all subsets of ½0; 1n and let G = F.
Denote by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities deﬁned by the Hausdorff
outer and inner measures; two events A and B in G0 are s-independent if the following
conditions hold:
(1) dimHðABÞ ¼ dimHðBÞ ¼ dimHðAÞ.
(2) P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ P ðAÞ and P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ P ðAÞ.
(3) P ðBjAÞ ¼ P ðBjAcÞ ¼ P ðBÞ and P ðBjAÞ ¼ P ðBjAcÞ ¼ P ðBÞ.Remark 1. Two disjoint events A and B are s-dependent since the Hausdorff dimension of
the empty set cannot be equal to the one of any other set so condition (1) is never satisﬁed.
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cally independent, are not s-independent.
We prove that logical independence between two events A and B is a necessary condi-
tion for s-independence when dimHA and dimHB are both less than n.
Theorem 2. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n let F be the r-field of all subsets of ½0; 1n, let G ¼ F and let us
denote by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities defined by the Hausdorff
outer and inner as in Theorem 1. Then two events A and B in G0 s-independent and such that
they both have Hausdorff dimension less than n, are logically independent.Proof. Since dimHA and dimHB are both less then n if A and B are s-independent then the
following conditions hold:
(1) dimHðABÞ ¼ dimHðBÞ ¼ dimHðAÞ.
(2) P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ P ðAÞ ¼ lnðAÞ ¼ 0 and P ðBjAÞ ¼ P ðAjAcÞ ¼ P ðBÞ ¼ lnðBÞ ¼ 0.
(3) P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ P ðAÞ ¼ lnðAÞ ¼ 0 and P ðBjAÞ ¼ P ðBjAcÞ ¼ P ðBÞ ¼ lnðBÞ ¼ 0.
From (1) we have that AB 6¼ ; since the Hausdorﬀ dimension of the empty set cannot be
equal to the one of any other set, from (3) we have P ðAjBÞ ¼ 0 then B 6A and PðBjAÞ ¼ 0
then A 6B. Moreover, since dimHA and dimHB are both less than n, then lnðA [ BÞ ¼ 0
while ln ðXÞ ¼ 1 so X 6¼ A [ B. h
We prove that logical independence is a necessary condition for the s-independence
when the events have Hausdorﬀ dimension equal to n and upper probability greater than
zero and less than one.
We can observe that, if upper conditional probability is deﬁned as in Theorem 1, the
condition 0 < PðAjXÞ < 1 is equivalent to 0 < hsðAÞhsðXÞ < 1 and due to the relation between
the n-Hausdorﬀ outer measure and the n-Lebesgue outer measure these last inequalities
are equivalent to 0 < lnðAÞ < 1.
Theorem 3. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n, let F be the r-field of all subsets of ½0; 1n let G ¼ F and let us
denote by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities defined by the Hausdorff
outer and inner as in Theorem 1. Two events A and B in G0, s-independent and such that they
both have Hausdorff dimension equal to n and 0 < lnðAÞ < 1 and 0 < lnðBÞ < 1, are logically
independent.Proof. Since A and B are s-independent, from condition (1) we have dimHAB ¼ n, that
implies AB 6¼ ;; from condition (3) we have P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ P ðAÞ ¼ lnðAÞ 6¼ 1 so
B 6A and Bc 6A; moreover, P ðBjAÞ ¼ P ðBjAcÞ ¼ P ðBÞ ¼ lnðBÞ 6¼ 1 so A 6B and Ac 6B.
Then A and B are logically independent. h
If G is properly contained in F and A belongs to F  G, for any G in G0 we cannot test
s-independence between A and G because epistemic independence is symmetric; it there-
fore requires that also A belongs to G0; in this case we introduce the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n, let F be the r-ﬁeld of all subsets of ½0; 1n and let G be an
additive subclass of F. Denoting by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities
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irrelevant to A if the following conditions hold:
(1) dimHðABÞ ¼ dimHðBÞ ¼ dimHðAÞ
(2) P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ P ðAÞ and P ðAjBÞ ¼ P ðAjBcÞ ¼ P ðAÞ.Deﬁnition 3. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n, let F be the r-ﬁeld of all subsets of ½0; 1n and let G be an addi-
tive subclass contained in F. Given A in F we say that G is s-irrelevant to A if any event H
of G such that dimHðAÞ ¼ dimHðHÞ is irrelevant to A.Proposition 1. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n, let F be the r-field of all subsets of ½0; 1n and let G be a sub-
field properly contained in F. Given A in F and B in G0 such that dimHA < n and dimHB < n,
then we have that if B is s-irrelevant to A then the following conditions hold:
(1a) AB 6¼ ;;
(2a) B 6A and Bc 6A;
(3a) X 6¼ A [ B.Proof. The result follows from Theorem 3. h
The previous results can be used to solve paradoxical situations proposed in literature
that show that the interpretation of conditional probability in terms of partial knowledge
breaks down in certain cases.
A conditional probability can be used to represent partial information as proposed by
Billingsley [1].
A probability space ðX;F; P Þ can be used to represent a random phenomenon or an
experiment whose outcome is drawn from X according to the probability given by P. Par-
tial information about the experiment can be represented by a sub r-ﬁeld G of F in the
following way: an observer does not know which x has been drawn but he knows for each
H in G, if x belongs to H or if x belongs to Hc.
A sub r-ﬁeld G of F can be identiﬁed as partial information about the random exper-
iment, and, ﬁxed A in F, conditional probability can be used to represent partial knowl-
edge about A given the information on G. If conditional probability is deﬁned by the
Radon–Nykodim derivative, denoted by P ½AkGx, by the standard deﬁnition we have that
an event A is independent from the r-ﬁeld G if it is independent from each H in G, that is
P ½AkGx ¼ PðAÞ with probability 1.
Example 5 (see [1, Example 33.11]) shows that the interpretation of conditional probabil-
ity in terms of partial knowledge breaks down in certain cases. In fact the eventA is indepen-
dent from the information represented byG and this is a contradiction according to the fact
that the information represented by G is complete since G contains all the singletons of X.
The contradiction can be dissolved if s-irrelevance is tested with respect to conditional
probabilities assigned by a class of Hausdorﬀ dimensional measures.
Example 5. Let ðX;F; P Þ be a probability space where X ¼ ½0; 1, F is the r-ﬁeld of Borel of
X and P is the Lebesgue measure on F. Let G be the sub r-ﬁeld of F of sets that are either
countable or co-countable.
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probability of A given G is equal to PðAÞ, with probability 1, if conditional probability is
deﬁned by the Radon–Nikodym derivative. That is
P ½AkGx ¼ P ðAÞ
except on a P zero subset of [0, 1].
Given A ¼ ½a; b with 0 < a < b < 1, let P* be a real function deﬁned on C ¼ FG0
such that the restriction P 	r to E ¼ fðA; fxgÞ : x 2 ½0; 1g is equal, with probability 1, to
the Radon–Nikodym derivative P ½AkGx. We have that P* is not coherent on C, since it
does not satisfy the property that P 	ðA; fxgÞ is equal to 1 or 0 according to whether x
belongs to A or not.
In Example 1, we show that a ﬁnitely additive conditional probability on C ¼ FG0
can be deﬁned by
P 	ðAjHÞ ¼
h1ðAHÞ
h1ðHÞ H co-countable
h0ðAHÞ
h0ðHÞ H finite
mðAHÞ H countable
8><
>:
where m is a 0–1 valued ﬁnitely additive (but not countably additive) probability measure.
The function P* is a coherent conditional probability since it veriﬁes the axioms of a
ﬁnitely additive probability in the sense of Dubins as proven in Theorem 1.
Since the conditioning events H are countable or co-countable subsets of [0, 1], they
have respectively Hausdorﬀ dimension equal to 0 or equal to 1.
Given A ¼ ½a; b with 0 < a < b < 1, we have that G is not s-irrelevant to A, since con-
dition (2) of the deﬁnition of s-irrelevance is not satisﬁed.
In fact for every G ¼ ½0; 1  fxg we have that P 	ðAÞ ¼ P 	ðAjXÞ ¼ h1ðAÞ is diﬀerent
from 0 and 1, while P 	ðAjGcÞ ¼ P 	ðAjfxgÞ must be, for the coherence equal to 1 or 0
according to whether that x belongs to A or not.5. Examples of s-independent events
If upper and lower conditional probabilities are deﬁned respectively by Hausdorﬀ outer
and inner measures then we have that
• every event B is not s-irrelevant for ; since condition (1) of the deﬁnition of s-irrele-
vance is never satisﬁed;
• every event B such that dimHðBÞ ¼ dimHðXÞ is s-irrelevant for X;
• every countable set B is s-irrelevant to a ﬁnite set A such that AB 6¼ ;, but A and B are
not s-independent since A is not s-irrelevant to B.
In the deﬁnition of s-irrelevance for events A and B no condition is given on the Haus-
dorﬀ dimension of their complementary sets; in fact two events can be s-independent even
if their complementary sets have diﬀerent Hausdorﬀ dimension.
Example 6. Let X ¼ ½0; 1. Given A ¼ 0; 12
 
and B ¼ ½0; 1  12 ; 23
 
we have that B is s-
irrelelvant to A. In fact the events A, B and AB have Hausdorff dimension equal to 1 so
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becomes
h1ðABÞ
h1ðBÞ ¼
h0ðABcÞ
h0ðBcÞ ¼ h
1ðAÞ
and it is satisﬁed since it vanishes to 1
2
¼ 1
2
¼ 1
2
.
We can also observe that A is s-irrelevant to B since condition (2) becomes
h1ðBAÞ
h1ðAÞ ¼
h1ðBAcÞ
h1ðAcÞ ¼ h
1ðBÞ
and it is satisﬁed since it vanishes to 1 ¼ 1 ¼ 1.
So A and B are s-independent.
In the following section other aspects of s-irrelevance and s-independence are investi-
gated; we compare the notions of s-irrelevance and s-independence with the notion of
strong independence proposed by Levi [10].6. s-Irrelevance, s-independence and strong independence
The notions of s-irrelevance and s-independence are based on the concepts of epistemic
irrelevance and epistemic independence proposed by Walley [12] with the further condition
that the relative events and their intersection must have the same Hausdorﬀ dimension.
The necessity of this last condition arises because the notion of epistemic independence
is not always related to the concept of logical independence.
The notions of s-irrelevance and s-independence are compared with the concept of
strong independence given for credal sets of probabilities [10].
A non-empty set K of probability measures is called a credal set; assuming that all the
probabilities in K are deﬁned on the same algebra, we can associate with any event A,
belonging to this algebra, a set of numbers denoted by KðAÞ, which is the set of numbers
determined by the values assumed by the probability measures of K in A.
In particular given a countable additive probability measure P, the natural extensions of
P are the inner and outer measures generated by P [12, Theorem 3.1.5]; they determine the
largest set associated with any event A, that is KðAÞ ¼ ½P ðAÞ; P ðAÞ.
Two events A and B are strongly independent when every extreme point of the largest set
K(AB) satisﬁes the standard deﬁnition of stochastic independence, given by the factoriza-
tion property.
Given two sets K(A) and K(B), there may be several sets K(AB), called extension of K(A)
and K(B), for which A an B are independent; the strong extension is the largest joint set
K(AB) satisfying strong independence with K(A) and K(B).
If KðAÞ ¼ ½P ðAÞ; P ðAÞ and KðBÞ ¼ ½PðBÞ; P ðBÞ and the factorization properties with
respect to lower and upper conditional probabilities, assigned by inner and outer Haus-
dorﬀ measures, hold, that is
P ðABÞ ¼ P ðAÞP ðBÞ and P ðABÞ ¼ PðAÞP ðBÞ;
then A and B are strongly independent and their strong extension is KðABÞ ¼
½PðABÞ; PðABÞ.
630 S. Doria / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 46 (2007) 617–635The following result proves that if an event B is s-irrelevant to an event A with respect
to upper and lower conditional probabilities assigned by Hausdorﬀ outer and inner mea-
sures then A and B are strongly independent.
We have to note that if X is equal to ½0; 1n and upper (lower) conditional probabilities
are assigned by Hausdorﬀ outer (inner) measures then the factorization property
PðABÞ ¼ P ðAÞPðBÞ becomes
hnðABÞ
hnðXÞ ¼
hnðAÞ
hnðXÞ
hnðBÞ
hnðXÞ
that is, hnðABÞ ¼ hnðAÞ hnðBÞhnðXÞ, or equivalently lnðABÞ ¼ lnðAÞlnðBÞ.
Theorem 4. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n, let F be the r-ﬁeld of all subsets of X and let G be an additive
subclass of F. Denoted by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities deﬁned
by the Hausdorff outer and inner measures and given A in F and B in G0, we have that if B
is s-irrelevant to A then the upper and lower conditional probabilities P and P satisfy the
factorization property.Proof. We prove that P satisﬁes the factorization property. The same reasoning can be
used to prove that also P satisﬁes the factorization property.
Recalling that P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAjXÞ ¼ hnðAÞhnðXÞ, diﬀerent cases are considered:
(a) if dimHðBÞ < n the factorization properties P ðABÞ ¼ P ðAÞP ðBÞ is satisﬁed since it
vanishes to 0 = 0.
(b) if dimHðBÞ ¼ n and hnðBÞ > 0, from condition (2) of the deﬁnition of s-irrelevance
we have
hnðABÞ
hnðBÞ ¼
hnðAÞ
hnðXÞ
that is the factorization property.
(c) if dimHðBÞ ¼ n and hnðBÞ ¼ 0 the factorization property becomes
hnðABÞ ¼ hnðAÞ h
nðBÞ
hnðXÞ
and it is satisﬁed since it vanishes to 0 = 0. hRemark 2. As a consequence of Theorem 4 we have that s-independence implies strong
independence. The converse of Theorem 4 is not true since no condition about the Haus-
dorff dimension of the sets that represent the events is given in the deﬁnition of strong
independence. Moreover, even if the sets A, B and their intersection AB have the same
Hausdorff dimension the factorization property does not imply s-irrelevance since this
is not a symmetric notion, while in this case s-independence with respect to upper and
lower conditional probabilities assigned by Hausdorff outer and inner measures is equiv-
alent to strong independence.
When X is a ﬁnite set, upper and lower conditional probabilities deﬁned by outer
and inner Hausdorﬀ measures are given by the counting measure, that is the Hausdorﬀ
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probabilities coincide since all subsets of X are measurable with respect to the counting
measure.
So we have that for every event A the only credal set associated with A is the singleton,
KðAÞ ¼ h0ðAÞ
h0ðXÞ
n o
; so in this case s-independence is equivalent to strong independence and
they are implied by the factorization property.
Example 7. Let X ¼ ½0; 1, let A be a ﬁnite set, B ¼ ½a; b with 0 6 a < b 6 1. Recalling
that PðAÞ ¼ PðAjXÞ and P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAjXÞ and that A and B are measurable with respect to
the Hausdorff measure of order 1 h1 (so upper and lower conditional probability are
equal), we have that the credal sets K(A) and K(B) are singletons; moreover, the
factorization property is satisﬁed because it vanishes to 0 = 0. Then A and B are strongly
independent but they are not s-independent; in fact, condition 1 of the deﬁnition of s-
irrelevance is not satisﬁed since dimHðAÞ ¼ 0 while dimHðBÞ ¼ 1.7. s-Conditional independence
In the previous section, the factorization property of upper and lower conditional prob-
abilities deﬁned respectively by Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures, has been proved
when an event B is s-irrelevant to another event A.
Theorem 4 of the previous section proves that the factorization property is satisﬁed
when the events A, B, AB and X ¼ ½0; 1n have the same Hausdorﬀ dimension and B is
s-irrelevant to A.
We can also observe that if the events A, B, AB have Hausdorﬀ dimension less than the
one of X, the factorization property is obviously satisﬁed because it vanishes to 0 = 0. This
happens because the factorization property is veriﬁed with respect to the outer (or inner)
measure of order n, that is the Hausdorﬀ dimension of X.
We want to investigate if, in this case, a more general factorization property with
respect to a conditioning event C is also satisﬁed. Denoted by s the Hausdorﬀ dimension
of a conditioning event C, we want to investigate when a generalized factorization property
is satisﬁed with respect to Hausdorﬀ outer and inner s-dimensional measures.
With this aim a generalized factorization property, with respect to any conditioning
event C, is introduced and it is proven to be a necessary condition of the notion of s-con-
ditional irrelevance.7.1. s-Conditional irrelevance and the generalized factorization property
The notion of s-conditional irrelevance and s-conditional independence are introduced
with respect to upper and lower conditional probabilities assigned by Hausdorﬀ outer or
inner measures.
Deﬁnition 4. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n let F be the r-ﬁeld of all subsets of X and let G be an additive
subclass of F. Denoted by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities deﬁned
by Hausdorff outer and inner measures and given A in F and B and C in G0, then B is s-
conditional irrelevant to A given C if the following conditions holds:
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(2a) P ðAjBCÞ ¼ PðAjBcCÞ ¼ P ðAjCÞ and PðAjBCÞ ¼ P ðAjBcCÞ ¼ P ðAjCÞ:
We can observe that if dimHðBcÞ ¼ n then condition (1a) is equivalent to condition
(1a 0) dimHðABCÞ ¼ dimHðACÞ ¼ dimHðBCÞ ¼ dimHðCÞ.Deﬁnition 5. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n, let F be the r-ﬁeld of all subsets of X and let G be an additive
subclass of F. Denoted by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities deﬁned
by Hausdorff outer and inner measures and given A in F and B and C in G0, then A and B
are s-conditional independent given C if B is s-conditional irrelevant to A given C and A is
s-conditional irrelevant to B given C.
We are interested now to generalize the factorization property, in the case where the
conditioning event is not necessary X.
Deﬁnition 6. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n let F be the r-ﬁeld of all subsets of X and let G be an additive
subclass of F. Denoted by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities deﬁned
by Hausdorff outer and inner measures and given A in F and B and C in G0, we say that P
and P satisfy the generalized factorization property if the following equalities hold:
P ðABjCÞ ¼ PðAjCÞPðBjCÞ and P ðABjCÞ ¼ PðAjCÞPðBjCÞ
The following theorem proves that the generalized factorization property is a necessary
condition of the notion of s-conditional irrelevance.Theorem 5. Let X ¼ ½0; 1n let F be the r-field of all subsets of X and let G be an additive
subclass of F. Denoted by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities defined by
Hausdorff outer and inner measures and given A in F and B and C in G0 such that B is s-con-
ditional irrelevant to A given C then P and P satisfy the generalized factorization property.Proof. We prove that P satisﬁes the generalized factorization property. The same reason-
ing can be used to prove that also P satisﬁes the generalized factorization property.
Let s ¼ dimHðCÞ; we have to consider the following cases:
(a) if 0 < hsðCÞ < 1, 0 < hsðB \ CÞ < 1 and 0 < hsðBcCÞ < 1, since B is s-irrelevant
to A given C from the deﬁnition of s-conditional irrelevance we have
hsðABCÞ
hsðBCÞ ¼
hsðABcCÞ
hsðBcCÞ ¼
hsðACÞ
hsðCÞ
that implies
hsðABCÞhsðCÞ ¼ hsðACÞhsðBCÞ
and dividing by ½hsðCÞ2 we obtain P ðABjCÞ ¼ PðAjCÞPðBjCÞ;
(b) if 0 < hsðCÞ < 1, hsðBCÞ ¼ 0 and 0 < hsðBcCÞ < 1, the generalized factorization
property is veriﬁed since it vanishes to 0 = 0;
(c) if 0 < hsðCÞ < 1, hsðBcCÞ ¼ 0 and 0 < hsðBCÞ < 1 then hsðCÞ ¼ hsðBCÞ and from
the deﬁnition of s-conditional irrelevance we have h
sðABCÞ
hsðBCÞ ¼ h
sðACÞ
hsðCÞ . It follows that the gen-
eralized factorization property is satisﬁed;
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conditional irrelevance we have mðABCÞ ¼ mðABcCÞ ¼ mðACÞ. The generalized factor-
ization property becomes mðABCÞ ¼ mðACÞmðBCÞ and it is veriﬁed since it vanishes to
0 = 0 or 1 ¼ 1 according to the fact that m(ABC) is equal to 0 or 1;
(e) if hsðCÞ ¼ 1, hsðBCÞ ¼ 1 and hsðBcCÞ ¼ 1 then from the deﬁnition of s-condi-
tional irrelevance we have that mðABCÞ ¼ mðBcCÞ ¼ mðACÞ; if mðABCÞ ¼ 0 then the
generalized factorization property is veriﬁed since it vanishes to 0 = 0 otherwise if
mðABCÞ ¼ 1 then for the monotony of m we have that mðBCÞ ¼ 1 and so the general-
ized factorization property is veriﬁed;
(f) if hsðCÞ ¼ 1, hsðBcCÞ < 1 and hsðBCÞ ¼ 1 from the deﬁnition of s-conditional
irrelevance we have that mðABCÞ ¼ mðACÞ then the factorization property becomes
mðABCÞ ¼ mðACÞmðBCÞ and it is veriﬁed since it vanishes to 0 = 0 or 1 ¼ 1 according
to the fact that m(ABC) is equal to 0 or 1;
(g) if hsðCÞ ¼ 1, hsðBcCÞ ¼ 1 and hsðBCÞ < 1 from the deﬁnition of s-condi-
tional irrelevance we have that mðABcCÞ ¼ mðACÞ and so mðABCÞ ¼ 0; moreover
from the axiom III of a ﬁnitely additive conditional probability we have that
mðBCÞ ¼ 0 then the generalized factorization property is satisﬁed since it vanishes to
0 = 0. h
The generalized factorization property does not require any condition on the Hausdorﬀ
dimension of sets so in general it does not imply s-conditional irrelevance. In particular we
prove that even if condition 1 of s-conditional irrelevance is satisﬁed, the generalized fac-
torization property does not imply s-conditional irrelevance. This follows also from the
fact that s-conditional irrelevance is not a symmetric property as the generalized factoriza-
tion property.
Example 8. Let X ¼ ½0; 1, let F be the r-ﬁeld of all subsets of [0,1] and let G be a sub r-
ﬁeld of F. Let us denote by P and P the upper and lower conditional probabilities deﬁned
by the Hausdorff outer and inner measures; given A ¼ 12 ; 14 ; 13
 
;B ¼ 12
 
and C equal to
the set of rationales of [0,1] we have that the generalized factorization property becomes
mðABCÞ ¼ mðACÞmðBCÞ and it is veriﬁed since it vanishes to 0 = 0. Moreover, denoted by
P ¼ P ¼ P we have that the second condition of s-conditional irrelevance,
P ðAjBCÞ ¼ P ðAjBcCÞ ¼ P ðAjCÞ, is not satisﬁed since h0ðABCÞ
h0ðBCÞ ¼ 1 while mðABcCÞ ¼
mðACÞ ¼ 0.7.2. s-Conditional irrelevance and s-irrelevance
In general the notion of s-conditional irrelevance is not related to the notion of s-irrel-
evance even if the conditioning event is X. An example of s-irrelevant but not s-conditional
irrelevant events given X is given.
Example 9. Let A and B be respectively a ﬁnite and a countable subset of X ¼ ½0; 1
with intersection different from the empty set. We have that B is s-irrelevant to A but B is
not s-conditional irrelevant to A given X since condition (1a) is not satisﬁed because
the Hausdorff dimension of C ¼ X is 1 while the Hausdorff dimension of A, B and
AB is 0.
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vance are equivalent when the events A, B, AB and Bchave the same Hausdorﬀ dimension
of C ¼ X.
Theorem 6. Given A, B and C subsets of X such that C ¼ X ¼ ½0; 1n and the Hausdorff
dimension of A, B, AB and Bc is equal to n, then B is s-conditional irrelevant to A given X if
and only if B is s-irrelevant to A.Proof. Since the Hausdorﬀ dimension of Bc is equal to n and B is s-conditional irrelevant
to A given X then conditions (1a 0) and (2a) are veriﬁed and they imply conditions (1) and
(2) of the deﬁnition of s-irrelevance. h
In the following example events A, B and C are proposed such that B is s-conditional irrel-
evant to A given C but B is not s-irrelevant to A.
Example 10. Let X ¼ ½0; 1 and let us denote P and P the upper and lower conditional
probabilities deﬁned by the Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures. Let A be the
complementary set of Cantor set (see Section 2), B ¼ ½0; 1  12 ; 13
 
and C ¼ 12 ; 512
 
.
We have that B is not s-irrelevant to A since condition (2) is not satisﬁed, in fact
P ðAjBÞ ¼ h
1ðA \ BÞ
h1ðBÞ ¼ 1; P ðAjB
cÞ ¼ h
0ðA \ BcÞ
h0ðBcÞ ¼
1
2
and PðAÞ ¼ h1ðAÞ ¼ 1
But B is s-conditional irrelevant to A given C. In fact condition (1a) is satisﬁed since
dimHðABCÞ ¼ dimHðBCÞ ¼ dimHðABcCÞ ¼ dimHðBcCÞ ¼ dimHðACÞ ¼ dimHðCÞ ¼ 0
and also condition (2a) is veriﬁed because
P ðAjBCÞ ¼ h
0ðABCÞ
h0ðBCÞ ¼ 1 ¼ P ðAjB
cCÞ ¼ P ðAjCÞ:
We can observe that C is contained in A so we can say that if B is s-conditional irrelevant
to A given C then A and C are not necessarily logically independent
8. Conclusions
The necessity to introduce a new tool to deﬁne upper and lower conditional probabil-
ities arises in the continuous framework, where the axiomatic deﬁnition of conditional
probability does not always assure separate coherence, as required in the approach of
Walley.
In this paper new models of upper and lower conditional probabilities are introduced.
They are deﬁned by a class of Hausdorﬀ outer and inner measures, when the conditioning
events have positive and ﬁnite Hausdorﬀ outer or inner measures in their dimension,
otherwise they are deﬁned by a 0–1 valued ﬁnitely, but not countably, additive probability.
This approach is based on the idea that commensurable events [4] with respect to the
given coherent conditional probability, are subsets of X with the same Hausdorﬀ dimen-
sion. Given a coherent conditional probability P* deﬁned on C ¼ FG0, any pair of
events A and B of G0 can be compared as proposed in de Finetti [4]. In fact
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so the above conditional probabilities cannot be both zero and their ratio can be used to
introduce an ordering between A and B. In fact this ratio is ﬁnite if either P 	ðAjA [ BÞ and
P 	ðBjA [ BÞ are ﬁnite and in this case A and B are called commensurable. Otherwise if one
of the conditional probabilities is zero, the corresponding event has a inﬁnitely less prob-
ability than the other and the two events A and B belong to diﬀerent layers [4]. We can
observe that when conditional probability, deﬁned in Theorem 1 is countably additive
there can only be ﬁnitely many layers above a given layer, in opposition to the condition
when conditional probability is only ﬁnitely additive.
Two events A and B of G0, commensurable with respect to the coherent conditional
probability deﬁned as in Theorem 1, are subsets of X with the same Hausdorﬀ dimension.
The converse is not true, in fact if A is countable and B ﬁnite then the two events have
Hausdorﬀ dimension equal to 0, but they are not commensurable with respect to the pre-
vious conditional probability, since coherence requires that P 	ðBjA [ BÞ ¼ 0. Two events
are commensurable in the sense of de Finetti if and only if they have both ﬁnite and posi-
tive Hausdorﬀ measure and the same Hausdorﬀ dimension.
The notions of s-irrelevance and s-independence are introduced and it is proven that
logical independence is a necessary condition of s-independence. Moreover, s-indepen-
dence is compared with the notion of strong independence given for credal sets. When
all the subsets of the sample space X have the same Hausdorﬀ dimension, as occurs when
X is ﬁnite, it is proven that s-independence is equivalent to strong independence; otherwise,
it is proven that s-irrelevance implies strong independence but an example is given to show
that the converse is not true.
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